Identifier: abrahamlincolnba02newy (find matches)
Title: Abraham Lincoln and the battles of the Civil War
Year: 1887 (1880s)
Authors:
Subjects: Lincoln, Abraham, 1809-1865 Generals Generals
Publisher: (New York, N.Y.) : (The Century Co.)
Contributing Library: Lincoln Financial Foundation Collection
Digitizing Sponsor: The Institute of Museum and Library Services through an Indiana State Library LSTA Grant

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k-ing to turn Meades left,and by interposing betweenhim and Washington, and threatening hiscommunications, to force him to attack theConfederate army in position; but Gen-eral Lee probably saw that Meade would beunder no such necessity; would have nogreat difficulty in obtaining supplies, and—disregarding the clamor from Washington —could play a waiting game which it would beimpossible for Lee to maintain in the opencountry. He could not advance on Baltimoreor Washington with Meade in his rear, norcould his army subsist itself in a hostile regionwhich would soon swarm with additional ene-mies. His communications could be cut off,for his recommendation to assemble even asmall army at Culpepper to cover them andaid him had not been complied with. A battle was a necessity to Lee, and a de-Vol. XXXIII.—37. feat would be more disastrous to Mead. i,less so to himself, at Gettysburg than at ampoint east of it. With the defiles of the SouthMountain range close in lus rear, which could \
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MAJOR-GENERAL DANIEL E. SICKLES. (FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.) be easily held by a small force, a safe retreatthrough the Cumberland Valley was assured,so that his army, once through these passes,would be practically on the banks of the Poto-mac, at a point already prepared for crossing.Any position east of Gettysburg would deprn ehim of these advantages. It i^ more probable that General Lee was influenced by coolcalculation of this nature than by hot blood,or that the opening sin cess of a chance battlehad thrown him off his balance. Whateverhis reasons, he decided to accept the gage oibattle offered by Meade, and to attack assoon as practicable. Ewell had made arrange-ments to take possession of Culps Hill in theearly morning, and his troops were underarms for the purpose by the time GeneralMeade had finished the moonlight inspection 282 THE SECOND DAY AT GETTYSBURG. of his lines, when it was ascertained by a recon-noitering party sent out by Johnson, that thehill was occupied and i

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